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NOTES
BLOGGERS BEWARE:
A CAUTIONARY TALE OF BLOGGING AND
THE DOCTRINE OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
"The stereotypical 'blogger' is sitting in his pajamas at his
personal computer posting on the World Wide Web his best product to
inform whoever happens to browse his way.
INTRODUCTION

The internet explosion of the early 1990s created a public forum for
the average person to express their ideas and opinions. Initially, the
internet was primarily used for research and correspondence through email. Today, the relatively low cost of computers has enabled the
majority of American adults to access the world wide web. The current
trend for internet users is creating online diaries, a form of expression
known as blogging.2
"Blogging" has become the newest craze for teens and twentysomethings. While in 2004, only five percent of internet users created
online blogs, 3 that percentage rose to nine percent by 2005. 4 In addition,

1. Jeffrey Schlossberg & Kimberly Malerba, Employer Regulation of Blogging, N.Y.L. J.,
Oct. 31, 2005, col. 4, at 4 availableat http://www.ruskinmoscou.com/Schlossberg%20Malerba
%20-%20Blogging%20NYLJ%20article%2011.05.pdf (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena of
Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
2. See Mark Huffman, 'Blog' Trend Provides Virtual Soapbox, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Jan.
18, 2003, http://www.upi.com/archive/view.php?archive- I&StorylD-20030118-122004-6980r. A
weblog (or blog) is "a website that contains an online personal journal with reflections, comments,
and often hyperlinks provided by the writer." Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, http://www.mw.com/dictionary/blog.
3. Memorandum from Lee Rainie, Dir., PEW Internet & Am. Life Project on the State of
Blogging (Jan. 2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPblogging-data.pdf.
4. Posting of Lee Rainie to PIP comments, http://www.pewintemet.orgiPPF/p/1083/
pipcomments.asp (May 2, 2005).
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the online population of those who read blogs increased substantially
from seventeen percent in 2004 to twenty-seven percent in 2005. 5
According to Kate Lorenz, the article and advice editor for
careerbuilder.corn,
Bloggers write about their lives to keep friends and family up-to-date,
talk about their industry, discuss hobbies or rant about their favorite
reality TV show. But posting pictures of you at work, disclosing
confidential information about your employer, or bad-mouthing your
co-workers
could get you in hot water for committing inappropriate
6
behavior.
Just as the legal community was faced with problems related to the
First Amendment that grew out of e-mail, it now faces legal
uncertainties brought about by blogging.7 The recent issue is the
growing number of employees who have been fired for the content of
their blogs.5
Bloggers such as Joyce Park, a former employee of Friendster, have
been fired for such minor infractions as posting already public
information on their personal blogs. 9 Friendster, a dot-coin that promotes
networking and community among web-users, terminated Ms. Park for
blogging.10 Her blog mentioned events at work, such as the fact that
Friendster launched a "platform rearchitecture based on loose-coupling,
web standards, and a move from JSP (via Tomcat) to PHP"'1 Although
Ms. Park only discussed the technological improvement of the website
and only encouraged users to give her feedback, the company ultimately
made the decision to fire her. 12 This is not the only instance in which an
employee has lost his or her job for discussing work-related information
on their personal blog.
5. Rainie memorandum, supra note 3, at 1-2.
6. See Kate Lorenz, Avoid Getting Fired for Blogging, April 6, 2005,
http://cnn.com/2005/US/Careers/04//05/blogging/.
7. See generally, Schlossberg & Malerba, supra note I (discussing the current dearth of case
law addressing blogging and the inevitability of future litigation given blogging's popularity).
8. See Posting of Ellen Simonetti to The Bloggers'
Rights Blog, http:!!
rights.journalspace.com (Jan. 4, 2005) (listing organizations that have fired, threatened, disciplined,
fined or not hired people because of their blogs).
9. Stefanie Olsen, Friendster Fires Developer For Blog, Aug. 31, 2004,
http://news.com.com/Friendster+fires+developer+for+blog/2100-1038-3-5331835.html.
10. No Friendster of Mine, RED HERRING, Sept. 9, 2004, http://www.redherring.com/
PrintArticle.aspx?a= 10839&sector=Industries.
11. Posting of Troutgirl to Friendster Goes PHP, http://troutgirl.com/blog/intex.php?/archives/
22_Friendster-goesPHP.html (June 29, 2004 00:09 EST).
12.

No Friendsterof Mine supra note 10.
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A Starbucks supervisor used a blog to keep in touch with family
and friends and to vent frustration about personal life and work. 13 When
a manager refused to let him go home one day because he was feeling
ill, he complained from his home computer by posting on his blog.14
Even though he did not use his real name, and only gave the blog's
address to a select group of people, he was terminated after six years
of
5
service and on the first day of his scheduled management training.'
Although the former Friendster and Starbucks employees have not
yet taken legal action, the case
of a former Delta flight attendant has
16
recently made its way to court.
On September 7, 2005, a former Delta Air Lines flight attendant
filed a federal sexual discrimination lawsuit claiming that she was
suspended and later fired because of material she posted on her personal
blog. 17 Ellen Simonetti was laid off after her "Queen of the Sky" blog
showed a picture of her in her Delta uniform. The blog, a moderately
fictionalized account of life in the air, never named Delta as her
employer, but one photo did show a pin indicating she worked for the
airline.1 8 Delta's decision to terminate her was based on "inappropriate
photographs" of plaintiff in her uniform on the website. 19 Ms. Simonetti
claims that she was not aware of any company anti-blogging policy. 20
According to a BBC News source, "[t]here is guidance which suggests
the company uniform cannot be used without approval from
21
management, but use in personal pictures on websites is unclear."
Ms. Simonetti asserts a claim based on sex discrimination, illegal
retaliation, and discharge in violation of the Railway Labor Act, due to
her support of the Association of Flight Attendants.22 Because there is
currently no legal recourse for claims related to blogging, lawyers and
former employees are forced to ignore the issue and focus their claims
on what may be secondary issues, such as sex discrimination. It is
13.

Jason Koulouras, Employer Fired by Starbucks Over Blog, BLOGCRITICS MAG., Sept. 4,

2004, http://blogcritics.org/archives/2004/09/04/04/l 41004.php.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Complaint, Simonetti v. Delta Air Lines Inc., No. 1:05-CV-2321, 2005 WL 2407621
(N.D. Ga. 2005).
17.

Id.

18. Jo Twist,
Blogger Grounded by
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/technology/3955913.stm.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21.

Her

Airline,

October

27,

2004,

Id.

22. Complaint, Simonetti v. Delta Air Lines Inc., No. 1: 05-CV-2321, 2005 WL 2407621
(N.D. Ga. 2005).
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unclear whether the law will provide a remedy for these bloggers or even
give them an opportunity to get through the courthouse doors. An issue
of the utmost concern for these bloggers is to determine whether their
termination was wrongful.
23
Blogging may be characterized as a new form of journalism.
However, bloggers may have a false sense of security because many
times they do not intend their blogs to be taken seriously. 24 According to
Jeffrey Schlossberg and Kimberly Malerba, "because the internet and
blogging are largely unregulated and easily accessible, many individuals
view a blog as a viable medium for venting their frustrations about their
employer and coworkers. 2 5
Blogging creates many concerns for employers, including
protecting trade secrets, facing liability for statements made by their
employees, and maintaining a positive public image.26 Employers have a
valid fear of retaliation against them. For example, if employees are
unhappy with their salary, status in the company, or just because they
had a bad day at work, they may choose to disclose confidential
information on their blog. 27 A Google employee was recently fired for
complaining on his blog that the company's benefits were less generous
than his former employer's (Microsoft). 28 There is also a concern that a
naive employee will not recognize the confidentiality of information and
mindlessly disclose proprietary secrets on their blog. 29 As a result, it is
easy to understand why companies would aim to prohibit employee
blogging. However, this contradicts company policies that embrace
blogging for its marketing and advertising opportunities.
Blogs are used by both small and large companies in an effort to
gain customers and improve services. 30 For example, GreenCine, a small

23. Larry E. Ribstein, Initial Reflections on the Law and Economics of Blogging, August 28,
2005, at 3, http:/home.law.uiuc.edu/-ribstein/bloggingarticle.pdf.
24. Thierry Nabeth, Privacy in the Context of Digital Social Environments: A Cyber
Sociological
Perspective,
http://www.calt.insead.edu/project/Fidis/documents/2005-PET-

Privacy-in theContextof DigitalSocialEnvironmentsACyber-SociologicalPerspective.pdf
(last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
25. Schlossberg & Malerba supra note I at 4.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Ilana DeBare, The Business of Blogging / Small Companies Promote Themselves Through
Web Logs, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (May 5, 2005), available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgifile=/chronicle/archive/2005/05/05/BUG41CGI4; Jena McGregor, It's A Blog World

After
All,
FAST
COMPANY
April
18,
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/8 I/blog.htm.

2004,

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol24/iss2/5
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San Francisco DVD rental company, uses blogs to increase their sales by
drawing people to read about film festivals and the world of independent
and alternative cinema.31 Since the creation of its blog GreenCine's sales
have doubled.32 Similarly, Microsoft has actually hired an employee to
communicate with customers on the Web through a blog. 33 Robert

Scoble, "The Scobleizer," as he is known by his daily readers, posts
information on his blog, mostly about Microsoft, which is even critical
of his employer at times.34 In addition, he receives feedback from his
readers on how to improve Microsoft's products.35 Companies such as
GreenCine and Microsoft that allow employees to engage in this
permanent form36of conversation expose themselves to the dangers
discussed above.
The purpose of this Note is to examine whether employees may be
terminated for the content of their blogs. Part I will discuss the legal
history of doctrines that play an important role in analyzing cases
regarding blogging such as at-will employment, freedom of speech,
trade secrets, privacy and employment related tort claims. Part II sets
forth the current law regarding these legal doctrines as it relates to
modern technology and the internet. Part III will discuss various
predictions of future rules regarding blogging. Because blogging is a
relatively new use of the internet for communication there is no settled
law based solely on the issue of blogging. This only perpetuates the
problem the legal community faces due to the avoidance of the new
issues concerning blogs. Part III also analyzes issues relating to blogging
according to well-settled legal doctrines that can be expanded to
accommodate the concerns of employers and employees. This Note
urges employers to take affirmative steps to ensure that their employees
understand and comply with company policies. Due to the public nature
of blogging, an employee's reasonable expectation of privacy is
diminished. Therefore, employees should be aware of the repercussions
of their actions, should they decide to make negative statements about
their employers on their blogs.

31.
32.
33.
34.

DeBare, supra note 30.
Id.
McGregor, supra note 30.
See id.

35.

Id.

36.

Id.
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I. LEGAL HISTORY

A. The DoctrineofAt- Will Employment
The doctrine of at-will employment lies at the heart of the
relationship between employer and employee. At-will employment
permits job termination with or without cause unless the termination
would somehow violate a public policy exception. 37 The doctrine further
provides that employment contracts for an indefinite term are at-will
agreements, 38 unless there is a clear and definite promise of permanent
or fixed duration employment.39 Contracts of indefinite duration are
terminable at the will of either party.40 Lastly, an at-will employee does
not have a constitutionally protected property interest in his continued
employment. 41 An examination of case-law supports this conclusion.
In Parker v. City of Elgin the plaintiff worked as a City Manager
for the city of Elgin.42 Her tenure as a manager was marked by an
ongoing dispute with the mayor of the city. 43 She also suffered from "a
debilitating eye condition." 44 The City Council asked for her resignation
and the plaintiff sued for numerous causes of action, including breach of
her employment contract.45 The court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment. 46 It reasoned that there existed an at-will
employment relationship between the defendant, the city of Elgin, and
the plaintiff, the city manager. 47 According to the doctrine of at-will
employment, an at-will employee may be terminated with or without
cause. 48 Although the plaintiffs employment contract provided that it
would apply for an indefinite term, the court concluded that contracts of
indefinite duration are terminable at the will of either party. 49 The
contract also provided that the plaintiff may terminate the agreement
37.
38.

Smith v. Farmers Coop. Ass'n ofButler, 825 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Okla. 1992).
Aug. 30,
Parker v. City of Elgin, No. 03-C-0171, 2005 WL 2171159, at *11 (N.D. I11.

2005).
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Smith, 825 P.2d at1326.
Parker, 2005 WL 2171159, at*12.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.

45.

Id.

46.
47.
48.
49.

Seeid. at*13.
See id. at *12.
See id. (citing Harris v. Auburn, 27 F.3d 1284, 1286 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Id. at *11.
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upon written notice, and that the contract may be terminated by the city
"acting through its corporate authorities."50 The defendant argued that
those provisions created an at-will employment relationship, and the
court agreed.5 1 Furthermore, the court concluded that because the
plaintiff was an at-will employee of the City, she had52no constitutionally
protected property interest in continued employment.
In Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center,53 the plaintiff,
a hospital employee, brought suit alleging that the defendant hospital
discharged her in violation of the terms of the employee handbook.54 She
alleged that the handbook distributed by the defendant created
enforceable contractual rights and the court agreed.55 The court held that
the handbook was a binding contract on the defendant and that the
defendant breached its contract by terminating the plaintiff in a manner
inconsistent with the handbook.56 The court agreed with the majority of
courts, which interpret the general "employment-at-will rule" as a rule of
construction mandating only a presumption that a hiring without a fixed
term is at-will and can be overcome by demonstrating the parties
contracted otherwise.57 The court reasoned in this case that the plaintiff
and defendant contracted through the distribution of the employee
handbook. 58 The court held in this instance, that the employee handbook
created enforceable contractual rights, because traditional requirements
for contract formation were present. 59 The court determined that the
employee reasonably believed an offer had been made since the
language was clear and unambiguous. 60 Further, the handbook was
disseminated to the employee in a manner that the employee would be
aware of its contents. 61 Finally, the employee accepted the offer by
continuing to work after learning of the policy statement.62 The court
reasoned that when these conditions are present, the employee's
continued work constitutes valid consideration for the promises

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
See id.
See id. at *12 (citing Harris, 27 F.3d at 1286).
505 N.E.2d 314 (Sup. Ct. Il. 1987).

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 315.
Id.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 318.
See id.

59.

Id.

60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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contained in the statement, and under traditional doctrine, a contract has
been formed. 63
Although the doctrine of at-will employment permits an employer
to terminate an employee with or without cause, the doctrine is not
unassailable. The protection of "whistle-blowers, workers' compensation
claimants, and other classes of employees subject to discrimination by
their employers has generated the most significant source of exception"
to the doctrine of at-will employment. 64 As such, a public policy
exception to the doctrine of at-will employment developed. Under this
exception, an employer cannot discharge an employee for refusing to
violate a criminal statute, exercising a statutory right, complying with a
statutory duty, or in any other way that violates the general public policy
of the state.65
B. FirstAmendment in Employment Situations

1. Government Employees
In order to establish that speech is constitutionally protected, a
plaintiff employee "must show that she spoke on matters of public
concern and that her interest in speaking was not outweighed by the
defendants' interest in promoting the efficient operation of the public
service which they perform., 66 In determining this question, the court
must consider the content, form, and context of a specific statement so
that it can fairly characterize if the expression 6as
a whole relates to a
7
matter of political, social or community concern.
In Rankin v. McPherson,68 the Supreme Court ruled "a state may
not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes that employee's
constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech. ' 69 In Rankin, the
respondent was terminated from her position as a deputy constable when

63. Id.at318-19.
64. J. Thomas Sullivan, The Arkansas Remedy for Employer Retaliation Against Workers'
Compensation Claimants, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 373, 393 (1994) (citing Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 383-385 (Ark. 1988)).
65. Sterling Drug, 743 S.W.2d at 383-85.
66. Wooley v. Madison County, Tenn., 209 F. Supp 2d 836, 842 (W.D. Tenn. 2002) (citing
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).
67. Wooley, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 842 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48; Chappel v.

Montgomery County Fire Prot. Dist. No. One, 131 F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir. 1997)).
68.

483 U.S. 378 (1987).

69. Id. at 383 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
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a co-worker overheard a comment she had made regarding a recent
presidential assassination attempt.7 ° The Court weighed the speech,
which was a matter of public concern, against petitioner's interest in
maintaining discipline in the workplace. 7 It was found that respondent
had not discredited her office by making the comment, since the
comment was made in private, in an informal conversation, with only
one other employee. 72 The Court concluded that the termination was
improper given the function of the agency, respondent's position in the
office, and the nature of her statement.73 The Court reasoned that in
determining a public employee's right of free speech, the task of the
Supreme Court is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
employee as a citizen and those of the state, as an employer. 74 It
concluded a state may not discharge an employee on a basis that
infringes that employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom
of speech.75
However, in Connick v. Myers76 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that a discharge will not offend the First Amendment when it
is based upon statements made by a public employee on matters of
personal interest and not public concern. 7 In Connick, the respondent
was employed as an Assistant District Attorney, and was opposed to her
transfer to another section of criminal court.78 She expressed her79
opposition to several of her supervisors including the District Attorney.
She then prepared a questionnaire soliciting the views of her co-workers,
expressing grievances regarding transfers, and office morale. 8° Soon
after, the District Attorney ordered her termination. 81 The employee
contended her job was wrongfully terminated because she had exercised
a constitutionally protected right of free speech. 82 Both the trial and
appellate courts agreed. 83 However, the Supreme Court of the United
70. Id. at 379-80. The respondent, upon hearing of the attempt on President Ronald Reagan's
life, commented to another co-employee "[if] they go for him again, I hope they get him." Id.
71. Id. at 388 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 570-73 (1967)).
72. Id. at 389.
73. Id. at 392.
74. Id. at 388.
75. Id. at 383.
76. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
77. Id. at 153
78. Id. at 140.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 141.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.

83.

Id. at 141-42.
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States reversed.84 The Court stated the employee's questionnaire touched
upon matters of public concern in only a most limited sense.85 According
to the Court, her survey was better characterized as an employee
grievance concerning internal office policy. 86 The Court held that the
limited First Amendment interest involved in this case did not require
the employer to tolerate the action, particularly because this was a selfbelieved would disrupt the office
interested action, which he reasonably
87
authority.
his
and undermine
2. Private Employees
The traditional doctrine of at-will employment permits an employer
to discharge an employee at-will for any reason or for no reason at all,
without incurring liability. 88 However, as an exception to this rule, an
employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the
discharge is contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy as
evidenced by existing law.89
In Schultz v. Industrial Coils, an employee wrote a letter to a local
newspaper, which criticized his employer and several of its officers. 90
Soon after the letter was published, the employee was fired.9 1 The
employee sued and alleged his discharge was wrongful because it was
grounded solely upon his exercise of free expression and thus directly
contravened the express public policy of the State of Wisconsin. 92 The
employer contended the letter was not against public policy, was
detrimental to the employer's interests and the employee's termination
was the result of a valid business judgment. 93 The court found the
employee was employed upon an at-will basis, which permitted his
employer to discharge an employee at-will for any reason or for no
reason at all, without incurring any liability. 94 The court looked to
Connick, where the court recognized that an employer need not tolerate
actions which undermine authority or discipline, or are otherwise

84.

Id. at 142, 154.

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 154.
Id.
Id.
Schultz v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 373 N.W.2d 74, 75 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).

89.

Id.

90. Id.
91.

Id.

92. Id. at 74.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
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disruptive of office routine or employment relations, in the name of a
limited free speech interest. 95 The court here concluded the employee's
termination did not contravene public policy and did not contravene his
First Amendment rights.96
C. Freedom of the Press andJournalism

1. Federal Privilege
The Supreme Court began to consider the implications of a federal97
journalist privilege as early as 1972 in the case of Branzburg v. Hayes.
However, Branzburg, the plaintiff journalist in that case, did not prevail
on his First Amendment argument. He argued journalists should have a
qualified privilege not to testify before the grand jury if the outcome is
to reveal a confidential source. 98 Freedom of the press includes
furnishing publishable information.9 9 The Court stated that requiring a
reporter to testify and divulge a confidential source is detrimental to the
free flow of information, which is vital to the First Amendment.1 0
The argument in favor of affording a privilege to journalists rests
on the proposition that the government cannot infringe upon a citizen's
First Amendment right to free speech any more than necessary "to
' The Court concluded that
achieve a permissible government purpose." 10
grand jury investigations are certainly necessary. °2 Further, the
investigations also meet the more stringent test of a "compelling" or
"paramount" interest to justify an indirect burden on First Amendment
rights. 10 3 The majority's opinion focused on problems involved in
defining a class of people as "journalists." 1°4 The result of defining such
a class could leave out people who perform the same functions as
journalists and would be constitutionally suspect.10 5 Freedom of the
press is "a 'fundamental personal right' which is not confined to

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 76.
Id. at 77.
408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972).
Id. at 680.
Id.
Id. at 725, 737-38 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 699.
Id. at 680.

103.

Id.

104.

Id. at 705.

105.

Id.
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newspapers and periodicals."' 0 6 Moreover, defining the class too broadly
would deprive the courts of well-informed witnesses. 07 The Court also
noted that proceedings to determine whether the privilege should be
upheld in each specific case would overwhelm the courts and make it
difficult for them to function efficiently. 108
Many lower federal courts later applied Branzburg only to grand
jury proceedings and continued to endorse the use of a journalist
privilege in other proceedings.' 09 However, since Branzburg,only a few
federal courts have dealt with this issue on more than one occasion and
the support given to the privilege is weak.110 Although federal support
for the journalist privilege is volatile, many state legislatures have
provided shield laws to protect certain defined groups of journalists or
media.I'
D. Privacy
Privacy, protected by the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure
provision,1 2 rests on whether the person who claims the protection of
the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place, and whether that expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable."l 3 Although the constitutional right to privacy
cannot be invoked against a private employer, a cause of action against a
private employer for invasion of privacy can arise under state law. An
example is illustrated in section 652B of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.11 4 The Restatement requires there be an "intentional[] intru[sion].
• .upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs
or
15
concerns" that would be "highly offensive to a reasonable person."
E. Trade Secrets
A trade secret is "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of

106. Id.at 704.
107. Id.at 705.
108. Id. at 703-04.
109. Anthony L. Fargo, Analyzing FederalShield Law Proposals: What Congress Can Learn
From the States, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y 35, 39 (2006).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 46.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
113. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan J., concurring).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION § 652B (1977).
115. Id.
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information which is used in one's business and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know 1or17
use it."' 116 A trade secret must be a secret, which is a question of fact.
In deciding a trade secret claim, several factors are considered including:
the extent to which the information is known outside of the business, the
extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the
business, the extent of measures taken by the business to guard the
secrecy of the information, the value of the information to the business
and its competitors, the amount of effort or money expended by the
business in developing the information, and the ease or difficulty with
which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by
others. 8
In order to obtain trade secret protection, a trade secret owner must
demonstrate that he actively pursued conduct designed to prevent the
unauthorized disclosure or use of the information. 119 The following
measures are sufficient to trigger this protection: (1) security, so that
except by the use of improper means, acquisition of the information
would be difficult; and (2) confidentiality, so that the trade secret owner
can communicate the information to employees who are involved in the
use of the trade secret. 120 However, it is not necessary for a trade secret
owner to build an "impenetrable fortress."' 21 He need only make22 efforts
that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain secrecy.
Vickery v. Welch 123 was the first case brought involving trade
secrets. 24 The case involved a recipe for chocolate, whereby the buyer
contracted to purchase the seller's chocolate business and the exclusive
right to use the seller's secret chocolate recipes. 125 After the seller
attempted to retain the right to sell the recipes to others, the buyer

116. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). There is no generally accepted
definition of trade secret but the first Restatement of Torts § 757 has been cited with approval by
courts. See, e.g., Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Janien, 624 N.E.2d 1007, 1012 (N.Y. 1993).
117. Ashland, 624 N.E.2dat 1013.
118. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939)).
119. David G. Majdali, Comment, Trade Secrets Versus the Internet: Can Trade Secret
Protection Survive in the Internet Age? 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 125, 136 (2000) (citing Jet Spray
Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 282 N.E.2d 921, 925 (Mass. 1972)).
120. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
121. Majdali, supra note 119, at 136 (citing E. 1. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher,
431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1970)).
122. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § l(4)(ii) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (1985).
123. 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523 (1837).
124. Majdali, supra note 119, at 127.
125. Vickery, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) at 525.
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brought a cause of action. 2 6 The court held in favor of the buyer and
found that the transfer of the seller's secret recipe to the buyer would not
harm the public, because the public did not care who owned the
exclusive right to use the recipe. 127 The court further stated the seller's
refusal to give the secret recipe to the buyer, despite the existence of the
contract, was entirely inconsistent with his obligation to the buyer. 128
The court noted that it was known to both parties that there was no
patent right granted to the seller, that it was for his exclusive secret, and
the secret would not be kept if put at large upon the records. 2 9 However,
this right was validly granted to the buyer, and should have been done so
in private so that he would have been able to preserve his right for his
own use and enjoyment. 130 Instead, the seller chose to defeat his
obligation and communicate32 the secret to others.' 31 As such, damages
were awarded to the buyer.'
F. Tort Causes ofAction in Employment Situations: Defamation
A viable action for defamation turns on whether the communication
or publication tends or is reasonably calculated to cause harm to
another's reputation.' 33 In Northport Health Services Inc. v. Owens,
nurses were fired from the work facility. 134 They sued the facility,
alleging, among other causes of action, wrongful termination and
defamation. 135 The question before the court was whether the facility36
acted in good faith when reporting their complaints about the nurses.1
The court affirmed the lower court's holding and held the facility acted
in bad faith when making its report. 137 The court stated that in order to
prove defamation, plaintiffs must establish the following: the defamatory
nature of the statement of fact, that statement's identification of or
reference to the plaintiff, the publication of the statement by the
defendant, the defendant's fault in the publication, the statement's

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id. at 527.
Id.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 527.
Vickery, 36 Mass. at 527.
Id.
Northport Health Serv. Inc. v. Owens, 158 S.W.3d 164, 172 (Ark. 2004).
Id. at 168.
Id.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 171.
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falsity, and that the allegedly defamatory statement implies an assertion
of an objective viable fact. 138 The court reasoned the plaintiffs were able
to establish actual damage to their reputations. 139 They maintained their
burden by proving that the defamatory statements were communicated
to
40
others and the statements detrimentally affected their relations. 1
IT C
II.

r

%.1'J

E N, -T
n-n
1X1
I LiA VV

A. The DoctrineofAt- Will Employment

Over time, many legal doctrines have been altered to correspond
with issues presented as a result of technological progress. However, the
doctrine of at-will employment is well-settled law with little room for
change. Even when faced with the latest technology such as
communication forums created by the internet, at-will employment
permits very few exceptions. 41 Since at-will employees enjoy no
property interest in their employment'

42

it is of little significance when

use of the internet spurs a termination.
In Pennsylvania, an at-will employment jurisdiction, an employee
of Pillsbury Co. was terminated because of the content of his e-mail. 143
Although the e-mail in question was sent over Pillsbury's e-mail system,
it was sent from the plaintiffs home computer and employees were
assured their e-mail communications would remain confidential.' 44 The
plaintiff claimed invasion of privacy, but the court did not believe the
situation violated a "clear mandate of public policy" that would "strike
at the heart of a citizen's social right[s] ....
As a result, the plaintiff
could be terminated regardless of the fact that
the
e-mail was understood
46
to be confidential and sent on his own time. 1

138. Id.
139. Id. at 172.
140. Id. at 172.
141. See generally Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (maintaining that
the Pennsylvania superior courts have only recognized three public policy exceptions to the at-will
employment doctrine; jury duty, prior convictions and reporting violations of federal regulations to

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
142.
2005).
143.
144.
145.
146.

Parker v. City of Elgin, No. 03-C-0171, 2005 WL 2171159 at *12 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30,
See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 98-99.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 101.
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The introduction of the internet to the workplace may in fact give
employers more leeway, if possible, in terminating an at-will
employee. 147 Employees who have a future compensation that reflects
past services, such as a bonus, can lose their right to compensation for
failure to comply with a company internet policy.148 For example, Mr.
Goldstein, an employee of PFPC Inc., was terminated and deprived of
his bonus for sending an e-mail that contained a photograph of a
partially nude woman. 149 This e-mail was a clear violation of the
company policy. 150 The claim stated that PFPC Inc. violated the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the e-mail was not the
true reason for his termination.1 5' Instead, Mr. Goldstein claimed the
actual ground for termination was that the company did not want to pay
him the compensation he had earned as a bonus. 152 The court was of the
opinion that the plaintiffs termination was permissible despite his
153
anticipated bonus because it was not in fact reflective of past services.
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not violated because
Mr. Goldstein violated the company policy, and as an at-will employee,
could be fired. 154 The doctrine of at-will employment does not change
simply because the internet is involved. 155 However, the internet may
raise concerns that spur exceptions to other basic rules of law.
B. FirstAmendment and the Internet

1. Government Employees
Many people trust that their internet posts cannot be regulated
because they enjoy the right to speak freely under the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution. 156 While a government employee does
not forfeit all of their rights to free speech simply by virtue of their

147.
2004).

See Goldstein v. PFPC, Inc., No. 0202145, 2004 WL 389107 (Mass. Super. Feb. 19,

148. Id. at*l.
149.

Id.

150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id. at*3.
Id.

153.

Id.

154. See id. at *1-3.
155.

See id.

156.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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employment, 157 a government employer does have the capacity to
restrict the speech of their employees in circumstances which would be
unconstitutional if applied to the general public. 158 As previously
discussed, public employees enjoy the right to free speech on matters of
public concern as well as on issues unrelated to their employment that
take place on their own time. 159 As a matter of policy, if there is a
governmental justification that is "far stronger than mere speculation"
regulating the topic, and if there is a "reasonable ground to fear that
serious evil will result if free speech is practiced," then there may be a
suppression of free speech. 160
For example, Joseph Roe, a former police officer for the city of San
Diego was terminated after he sold home made videotapes containing
sexually explicit material via the internet. 161 Roe brought suit claiming
that his termination violated his right to free speech. 162 The city agreed
that the acts in question were unrelated to Roe's employment; however,
it took the position that this particular speech was contrary to city
regulations and harmful to the proper functioning of the police force. 163
Applying the threshold test set out in Connick, discussed supra, the
Court decided the Pickering balancing test did not apply here because
the speech was not a matter of public concern. 164"Roe's activities did
nothing to inform the public about any aspect of the San Diego Police
Department's functioning or operation."' 165 Infact, the Court held that
Roe's speech was "widely broadcast, linked to his official status as a
police officer . . . designed to exploit his employer's image" and
therefore detrimental to the San Diego Police Department. 166 The Court
applied the general tests used for freedom of speech issues with regard to
public employees. It did not focus specifically on the fact that the

157. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004).
158. Id.; see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006) (holding that when a public
sector employee is speaking pursuant to his job duties, he does not have first amendment
protection).
159. Id.
160. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995).
161. Roe, 543 U.S. at 78.
162. Id.
163. Id.at81.
164. Id. at 83-84. The Pickering Court adopted a balancing test
thatrequires the court to
evaluate restraints
on a public employee's speech to balance "the interests
of the [employee], as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
165. Roe, 543 U.S. at 84.
166. Id.
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internet was used as the vehicle of expression. However, relevant
components of the Court's decision were the fact that the speech was so
"widely broadcast,"' 167 and the fact that the internet was what provided
the vehicle for this information to be publicly distributed.
2. Private Employees
While it is true that people enjoy the right to speak freely under the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution, 168 at-will employees
can be terminated for the content of their speech. In addition, space over
the internet is privately owned by Internet Service Providers.169 These
Internet Service Providers have the authority to control the content
posted on the space they own. 170 Actually, Congress encourages Internet
Service Providers to regulate content because they do not have the
authority to do so on their own. 171In fact, the law provides protections
72
for those who provide users with interactive computer services. 1
Internet Service Providers cannot be held liable on account of
"action[s] taken in good faith to restrict access or availability of material
73
...considered to be obscene, lewd ... or otherwise objectionable."1
This is true even if the material is constitutionally protected. 174 Along
with the Internet Service Providers ability to decide what content is
posted and remains on their site, in some situations, courts can demand
Internet Service Providers to release the identity of users to enforce other
laws. 17 Over the years there have been a number of cases in which
courts have required Internet Service Providers to release information
sufficient for
identification of a user or the identity of the user
76
themselves. 1

167. Id.
168. U.S. CONST. amend I.
169. See Vasilios Toliopoulos, Regulating Your Internet Diet: The Can Spam Act of 1999, 10
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.& POL'Y 175, 177 n. 15 (1999).
170. Id. at 18-82.
171. Id. at 181.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See generally Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451,458 (Del. 2005) (discussing the policy
underpinnings of the judiciary's selection of the plaintiffs burden to be met before revelatory
information about anonymous bloggers must be turned over in discovery).
176. See generally In re Baxter, No. 01-00026-M, 2001 WL 34806203, at *12-16 (W.D.La.
Dec. 20, 2001); Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 773, 776-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

2001).
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3. Anonymous Speech
Internet speech including blog postings are often anonymous and
are entitled to First Amendment Protection. Recently, the Delaware
Supreme Court recognized the rights of on-line bloggers in the case of
Doe v. Cahill.7 7 The blog at issue contained allegedly defamatory
material, which concerned Mr. Cahill, a public figure. 178 Mr. Cahill
sought to compel disclosure of Doe's identity from a third party Internet
Service Provider who had the information. 179 In an attempt to keep his
identity unknown, Doe filed an "Emergency Motion for Protective
Order.' 180 The court was clear in their attempt to protect the competing
rights of both parties and emphasized that the right to free speech did not
protect defamatory statements. 181 The court acknowledged the internet as
"a unique democratizing medium unlike anything that has come before.
The advent of the internet dramatically changed the nature of public
discourse by allowing more and diverse people to engage in public
, 182
debate."
Ultimately, the court required a defamation plaintiff to satisfy a
summary judgment standard before revealing the identity of an
anonymous internet user. 183 The court distinguished the reliability of
information found on the internet from other more reliable sources of
information. 184 "Blogs and chat rooms tend to be vehicles for the
expression of opinions; by their very nature, they are not a source of
facts ... upon which a reasonable person would rely."' 85 Another court
recently referred to blogs and chat rooms in a similar light, stating these
forums tend to be "replete with grammar and spelling errors... many of
the messages are vulgar and offensive .

. .

. In this context, readers are

unlikely to view the messages posted anonymously as assertions of
186
fact."

177.
178.
179.
180.

884 A.2d at 456.
Id. at 454.
Id. at 454-55.
Id. at455.

181.

Id. at 456.

182. Id.
at 455.
183. Id. at 457.
184. Id. at 465.
185.

Id.

186. Rocker Mgmt. LLC v. John Does, No. 03-MC-33, 2003 WL 22149380, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
May 29, 2003).
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C. Freedom of the Press,Journalistsand the Internet

1. Federal Privilege
Once a trade secret is posted on the Internet for all to see, by an
employee, former employee or third party, companies encounter
difficulties uncovering the identity of the misappropriator."'8 A third
party claiming to be a journalist can complicate matters further. A
California court recently avoided the issue of whether a blogger qualifies
as a journalist for purposes of the laws protections. 188
Apple Computer Inc, brought suit against unnamed individuals
claiming they "had leaked specific, trade secret information about new
Apple products to several online websites." 189 During discovery Apple
requested a number of documents that would reveal the defendants'
identities.1 90 The "John Does" brought a motion seeking a protective
order based on their claim that they were "journalists" and thus entitled
to invoke a privilege against disclosing their sources. 191 The court stated,
"some might refer to the moving parties as 'bloggers' ' 192 and went on to
define a blog as an "online diary: a personal chronological log of
thoughts published on a web page."' 193 Rather than making a distinction
between bloggers and journalists, the court rested its decision on the fact
that both the United States and California Supreme Courts apply trade
secret laws to everyone regardless of their status.1 94 The California
95
legislature has not made any exception for journalists or bloggers.'
Circuit Judge Sentelle briefly addressed the issue of bloggers in
187. See e.g., Apple Computer Inc., v. Doe, No. 1-04-CV-032178, 2005 WL 578641 at *1
(Cal. Super. Mar. 11, 2005).
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. Id. Apple requested all documents relating to the identity of any person or entity who
supplied information regarding an unreleased Apple product with specific code-names including; (a)
all documents identifying any individual or individuals who provided information relating to the
Product; (b) all communications from or to any Disclosing Person(s) relating to the Product; (c) all
documents received from or sent to any Disclosing Person(s) relating to the Product; and (d) all
images, including photographs, sketches, schematics and renderings of the Product received from or
sent to any Disclosing person(s). Id. at *1-2.
191. Id. at *2.
192. Id.
193. Id. at n.4. In defining the word "blog," the court relied on the definition provided by an
online dictionary. Id. (citing Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/blog (last
visited February 20, 2007)).
194. Apple ComputerInc., 2005 WL 578641, at 4.
195. Id.
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relation to a journalistic privilege in his concurring opinion of the96
controversial case involving New York Times reporter, Judith Miller.'
In discussing whether a constitutional or federal common law privilege
existed which gave journalists the right to refuse to disclose confidential
sources from grand jury investigations, Justice Sentelle pointed out the
the persons1 who
difficulties that would arise in identifying
.. . would be
197
the protection
e.nttled to,
-......
-v-,,

o' the

privile

1-

with the
Consistenf

idea that

freedom of the press is a basic fundamental right, which includes "every
sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and
opinion"' 198 it seems that courts should include the "proprietor of a
weblog." 199 Justice Sentelle refers to that informal stereotypical blogger
in their pajamas discussed supra, and recognizes that because of the
broad breadth afforded to the freedom of the press, it would be difficult
200
to exclude bloggers and remain consistent with the view of the courts.
He expresses his concern that a blog can be utilized for unlawful
purposes and a journalistic privilege will protect the blogger by
forbidding them to disclose the identity of the confidential source.20
D. Privacy and the Internet
Privacy, afforded by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution's
search and seizure provision,20 2 also deals with internet

communications.23

A defendant

is afforded a limited reasonable

expectation of privacy in e-mail messages. 204 While an e-mail message
bears some resemblance to sending a letter through the mail, the Fourth
Amendment right diminishes when an individual sends information via a

196. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 979-81 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(Sentelle, D., concurring) cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005). Judith Miller refused to reveal a
confidential source to the grand jury claiming, among other things, that the First Amendment
afforded journalists a constitutional right to conceal their confidential sources from grand jury
subpoenas. Id. at 967.
197. Id. at 979-81.
198. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
199. Miller, 379 F.3d at 979.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 979-80. If the court does not have the ability to draw a line that would eliminate
bloggers from the protection of a journalistic privilege, many problems could arise. It would be
possible for a governmental official to call a trusted friend or a political ally, advise him to set up a
web log (understood to take about three minutes) and then leak unlawful information, which the law
forbids the official to disclose, under a promise of confidentiality. Id.
202. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
203. See U.S. v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184-85 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
204. Id.at 1184.
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computer.20 5 The extent to which this expectation diminishes depends
upon the type of e-mail sent and the intended recipient. 206 The more
"open" a form of communication over the Internet, the further the
privacy rights are diminished. 0 7 For example, the court in Maxwell
afforded AOL users more privacy rights than users of other less secure
internet communications because by using AOL they had a reasonable
expectation of privacy.208 This view of the internet is premised on the
inability of police officials to intercept the communication without a
search warrant,
and is a clear example of how courts regard internet
2 °9
privacy.
These issues of privacy in e-mail and internet communications have
had similar outcomes when dealing with employment situations. 210 For
example, in Garrity v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company,
the plaintiffs claim rested on the fact that an employer led the plaintiff
to believe personal e-mails could be kept private by the use of passwords
and e-mail folders. 211 The cause of action was for unlawful interception
of wire communications and wrongful termination in violation of public
policy, among other things.2 12 Even in the absence of a company e-mail
policy, the messages would at some point be accessible by a third party.
With this knowledge the plaintiff communicated the information
voluntarily. 2 3 As a result, the court concluded the plaintiff had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail messages.21 4 The court
noted, "Even if plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
work e-mail, defendant's legitimate business interest in protecting its
employees from harassment in the workplace would likely trump
plaintiffs' privacy interests. 215

205. Id.
206. Id. at 1185 (citing U.S. v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406,418-419 (C.A.A.F 1996)).
207.
208.
209.
210.

Maxwell, 45 M.J. at417.
Id.
Id. at 418.
See generally Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 00-12143-RWZ,

2002 WL 974676 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002) (noting that because the c-mails were voluntarily sent
over a system utilized the entire company and the plaintiff knew they could be accessible by a third
party there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the communications).
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2 (quoting Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
Id.
Id.
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E. Trade Secrets and the Internet
As a matter of policy and law, companies possess the right to, and
2 6 Usually threats of
are in fact required to, protect their trade secrets. 211
misappropriation arise through a breach of confidence and theft.2 17
However, a misappropriator can use the internet to post information and
have a worldwide audience at their disposal.21 8 Accordingly, the internet
may make it easier for people to leak company trade secrets and make it
more difficult for companies to prevent it. Once an alleged trade secret is
posted on the internet, the information loses its trade secret status. 219 A
series of cases that arose in 1995 involving the Religious Tech Center
concluded that "once a trade secret is posted on the Internet, it is
effectively part of the public domain, impossible to retrieve., 220 The
party who revealed the information may be liable for misappropriation
but the parties who actually download the information are free of any
liability. 22' Since trade secrets are ultimately forfeited when posted on

the internet, a company who possesses trade secrets has an
immeasurable interest in preventing the use of the internet to "publish"
company information.
F. Tort Causes ofAction and the Internet
There are also various tort causes of action that companies may be
able to assert based on use of the internet.2 22 The internet enables people
to engage in certain tortious activity entirely online and anonymously. 223
This is a problem because companies will find themselves chasing the
tortfeasor from one Internet Service Provider to another with practically
no hope of success.224 Courts tend to direct their attention to the casual
216. Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523, 526 (1837).
217. Majdali, supra note 119 at 141 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470
(1974)).
218. Id.at 142.
219. See generally Religious Tech Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Serv., Inc., 923 F. Supp.
1231, 1256 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Religious Tech Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 901 F. Supp 1519, 1526
(D. Colo. 1995); Religious Tech Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E. D. Va. 1995).
220. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. at 1368.
221. Netcom, 923 F. Supp. at 1256; F.A.C.T. NET, 901 F. Supp at 1525; Lerma, 908 F. Supp.
at 1368.
222. See generallyColumbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D.Cal. 1999);
Rocker Mgmt. v. John Does, No. 03-MC-332003, 1993 WL 22149380 at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 29,
2003); Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. 2003).
223. Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578.
224. Id.
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nature of the internet, which makes success with claims of libel or
business disparagement difficult.
Since the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects
statements of opinion, a necessary element of the tort cause of action for
libel is a statement of fact.225 In cases of libel the court must "put itself
in the position of the . . .reader" to determine the meaning of the
statement and the "natural and probable effect [it would have] upon the
mind of the average reader., 22 6 The court also looks to whether the
statements are factual in the sense that they are capable of being proven
true or false. 227 Statements made on the internet are typically assumed to
be statements of opinion.228 Therefore, cases of improper spelling,
grammar and capitalization support this assumption and quash the
possibility of libel.2 29 Chat rooms in particular may pose a problem for a
plaintiff looking for compensation based on a libel. For example, Yahoo
message boards contain a warning that postings "are solely the opinion
and responsibility of the poster" and courts find that readers are unlikely
to view anonymous postings as assertions of fact.2
With regard to free speech, privacy, the possible disclosure of trade
secrets and the capability of committing torts over the internet, courts are
attempting to stay within the bounds of settled law. By depicting the
internet as informal and shoddy in nature, the courts have characterized
the content found on the internet as information upon which reasonable
people would not rely. While courts consistently recognize and
emphasize the value of the internet as a public forum for communication
they also acknowledge the diminished right of privacy afforded to
internet communications.
III. ANALYSIS
It is a frequent misconception that rights granted by the constitution
are absolute and provide for an adequate defense.2 31 In circumstances
such as those presented here, these constitutional rights are subject to
other areas of the law. The following discussion analyzes First
Amendment rights, privacy, trade secrets and defamation based upon the

225. Nicosia v. De Rooy, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1101 (N.D.Cal. 1999).
226. Rocker Mgmt., 1993 WL 22149380, at *2.
227. Id.
228. See id.

229. Id.
230.

Id.

231.

See U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend IV.
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doctrine of at-will employment as it relates to blogging.
A. FirstAmendment Rights and Blogging

1. Government Employees
A government employer has a greater capacity to restrict the speech
of their employees in circumstances which would be unconstitutional if
applied to the general public. 232 For example, though the Court in Roe,

discussed supra, found the speech in question was unrelated to Roe's
employment, it found the speech to be harmful and contrary to
regulations to the proper functioning of the police force.233 As a result,
the Court deemed the speech not to be protected under the First
Amendment.234 In addition, the Court determined Roe's speech was
unprotected under the First Amendment because the information was
widely disseminated. 235 The internet provided Roe with the medium to
sell his pornographic materials.236
Based upon the principles set forth in Roe, we can conclude a
blogger who is a public employee, receives less protection from the First
Amendment for the things posted on his or her blog. Should a blogger
post sexually explicit information or defamatory speech that does not
touch upon public concern on their blog, that public employee may be
fired for such postings because the information is not protected by the
First Amendment.
Similarly, if we apply Connick to the situation of a blogger who is
also a public employee, we can conclude such a person's speech on their
blog is not protected by the First Amendment.2 37 In Connick, the
Supreme Court held a discharge did not offend the First Amendment
when based upon statements made by a public employee upon matters of
personal interest and not public concern. 238 The method by which a
public employee chooses to express grievances relating to their
employer, whether through a questionnaire or by posting on a blog,
makes little difference. In each instance, neither is protected by the First

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004).
Id. at 81, 84-85.
Id. at 80, 84-85.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 78-79.
Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
Id. at 154.
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Amendment because according to Connick, the statements made were
pursuant to a personal interest and not a matter of public concern.23 9
Therefore, should a public employee in a similar situation to Connick
(an Assistant District Attorney), choose to defame his employer on his
blog, or solicit views of others regarding his employer through his blog,
his employer is under no obligation to maintain his employment.
2. Private Employees
Pursuant to Doe, speech over the internet is entitled to First
Amendment protection. 240 This protection extends to anonymous
internet speech, including speech in blogs or chat rooms, but does not
extend to defamatory speech. 24' According to the court, "it is well
understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and
under all circumstances. 242
Although bloggers may believe they are entitled to First
Amendment protection when posting on their blogs, the court in Doe
makes clear that bloggers, like other internet users, do not enjoy absolute
protection by the First Amendment.24 3 Therefore, because this First
Amendment protection is not an absolute right, it does not shield
bloggers from the doctrine of at-will employment. Bloggers can thus be
fired with or without case and cannot rely on their First Amendment
rights as an adequate defense.
B. Freedom of the Press,Journalismand Blogging
According to caselaw, journalists are not afforded additional
privileges from the Federal Government based on the First
Amendment. 244 However, state shield laws may protect bloggers from
divulging sources from which they receive the information they post on
the internet.245 Since some state shield laws define the term journalist so
broadly it will not be difficult to fit a blogger into the statute.
Due to the nature of the blogs discussed supra, it would be less

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
ARTS &

Id.
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451,456 (Del. 2005).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes Part I.C.
William E. Lee, The Priestly Class: Reflections on a Journalists'Privilege, 23 CARDOZO
ENT. L.J. 635, 657 (2006).
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likely for one of them to be protected by most state shield laws;
however, more and more blogs are popping up that are owned by hightech publishers and acquire followers in the media world.246 If these
visible blogs are compared with the more traditional forms of
publication it will be difficult for states to draw a line that eliminates
bloggers as journalists.
C. Privacy and Blogging
The search and seizure provision of the Fourth Amendment does
not apply to private parties; however, the law has been forced to evolve
with the internet. The way courts view privacy of internet
communications gives insight as to how they may deal with blogging in
the future. An expectation of privacy wanes when communication is
transmitted over the internet. 247 Moreover, the more "open" a
communication is, the less privacy a reasonable person will expect. A
reasonable person should foresee decreased privacy when using a widely
broadcast medium such as the internet as their forum of
communication.248
Based on Maxwell, where the court afforded more privacy to AOL
users based only on the secure quality of AOL, a blog user will likely
receive a decreased right to privacy. Not only is a blog inherently open
in nature, but the intended recipient of a blog is the "blogosphere" in
general, comprised of approximately fifty million people. 249 A popular
blog host, blog.com, owned by Google, affords their bloggers the same
privacy rights Google provides for other services. 250 The issue here is
that a blog is not comparable to e-mail, particularly in a privacy sense
because e-mail is sent to specific recipients. However, bloggers are
concerned with the anonymous character of the practice and do expect
that their employers will not be aware they are the author of a blog.

246. See Clive Thompson, Blogs to Riches: The Haves and Have-Nots of the Blogging Boom,
NEW YORK MAG., Feb. 20, 2006, at 26.
247. See generally U.S. v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (S.D. Ohio 1977)
(discussing that Defendant could not have a "reasonable expectation of privacy while using AOL..
. .11).

248. See generally U.S. v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406,417 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
249. Rob
McGann,
The Blogosphere by the Numbers, Nov. 22, 2004,
http://www.clickz.com/stats/sectors/traffic-pattems/article.php/3438891.
250. See generallyBlogger Privacy Notice, http://www.blogger.com/privacy (noting that a user
must type his username and password before entering Blogger.com, but Google keeps the
information confidential).
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Google's privacy policy, 251 for example, provides that Google will not
divulge a blogger's personal information; however, nothing stops people
outside of Google from communicating the identity of an anonymous
blogger. Moreover, the use of passwords for blog access may increase
the privacy expectation of a blogger, but it will most likely not be a
material difference that would greatly affect the outcome of the law.
D. Trade Secrets and Blogging
Based upon the principles of law set forth in the Religious Tech
cases, there is little doubt that an at-will employee who chooses to post
information regarding his employer's trade secrets on a blog, will retain
his employment. 25 2 The doctrine of at-will employment enables an
employer to fire an employee with or without cause.253 In light of the
increased use of the internet as means to dispel trade secrets, employers
certainly have great cause for concern. The internet, and blogs in
particular, present a fast, easy and affordable way for an employee to
post his employer's trade secrets in an effort to perhaps take revenge
against his employer for not giving him the raise he wanted. As such, it
has become necessary for employees to enact precautionary measures,
254
such as security schemes, in order to protect their trade secrets.
Although an employer has a right to fire an employee based upon the
doctrine of at-will employment for misappropriation,255 and that
employee may be held directly liable for his actions, 256 the cost to an
employer of losing a trade secret can be a large one - including the loss
of a business.
E. Tort Causes ofAction and Blogging
The internet brought opportunities for people to engage in tortious
activity with a low probability of being exposed. It would seem safe to
conclude that because of this, courts address these issues in a particularly

251. See generally Google Privacy Center, http://www.google.com/privacy.html (noting that a
user's personal information is confidentially safeguarded in Google's confidential computer
database).
252. See supratext accompanying notes 220-21.
253. See Parker v. Elgin, No. 03 C0171, 2005 WL 2171159 at *9 (N.D. Il. Aug. 30, 2005).
254. Majdali, supra note 119, at 145.
255. See Parker,2005 WL 2171159, at *9.
256. See generally Apple v. Doe, No. 1-04-CV-032178, 2005 WL 578641 at *1 (Cal. Super.
Mar. 11, 2005).
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severe manner. This, however, is not the case. In fact, courts seem to be
a bit more relaxed when faced with the fictional nature of information
found on the internet.257 Much of the information posted on the internet
is very informal and contains spelling and grammar errors. This would
not lead an average reader to believe the statements are true or factual,
which is necessary for a claim of libel. In contrast, it would lead an
observer to believe that they are reading opinions. 2 The very idea of a
blog is to create an online diary. A diary, defined in Merriam Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary, is "a record of events, transactions, or
observations, kept daily or at frequent intervals., 259 The use of the word
'observations' demonstrates that diaries contain opinions. When faced
with cases which involve blogs, courts will most likely agree that online
diaries are informal in nature. Therefore, a reasonable person would not
perceive a blog as factual, making it difficult to state a claim of libel.
CONCLUSION

Bloggers such as Joyce Park, Ellen Simonetti and the former
Starbucks supervisor have each learned the limits of their First
Amendment Rights. Unfortunately for them, and many other employees
who are similarly situated, the method in which they were held
accountable for
the content of their blog was through termination of their
260
employment.
Blogging is a form of publication that provides employers with
tangible proof of negative statements made by employees. Not only are
these statements capable of damaging a company's reputation but they
may also destroy company morale. By not reacting to such behavior,
employers run the risk of others becoming privy to confidential
information held by the company. 261 This in turn can cause ramifications
such as loss of trade secrets, decline in stock price, and other financial
damage.262

257. Rocker Mgmt. LLC v. John Does, No. 03-MC-33, 2003 WL 22149380, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
May 29, 2003).
258.
259.

Id.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, (Merriam Webster Incorporated

1993). The definition of diary includes the definition of journal as "a daily record of personal
activities, reflections or feelings." Id.
260. See also Schlossberg & Malerba, supranote 1, at 4.
261. See Majdali, supra note 119; see also Religious Tech Ctr. v. Netcom, 923 F. Supp. 1231
(N.D. Cal. 1995); Religious Tech Ctr. v. F.A.C.T. NET, 901 F. Supp 1519 (D. Colo. 1995);
Religious Tech Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E. D. Va. 1995).
262. See Netcom, 923 F. Supp. at 1231.
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Since blogging is a relatively new trend, there is a shortage of case
law to help predict where courts will come out on the issue.263 However,
based upon our examination of the doctrine of at-will employment as it
relates to First Amendment rights, privacy, trade secrets and defamation,
2 64
bloggers will not be afforded any additional protections under the law.
Therefore, bloggers should think twice before posting anything related to
their employment on the internet. While blogging may seem to be a
harmless act, taking a conversation between two co-workers at a water
cooler and publishing it on a public domain takes company gossip to
new level.
Courts have not yet had the opportunity to rule on whether the issue
of blogging should be encompassed within the law.265 For this to happen,
plaintiffs will need to bring a cause of action based upon a violation of
their constitutional rights, or an employer's tortious conduct, rather than
under the disguise of sexual discrimination.266
In the meantime, bloggers should ask themselves if what they are
posting on their online diaries is worth the price of losing their job.
Tracie Watson and ElisabethPiro*

263. Schlossberg & Malerba, supra note 1, at 4.
264. See generally Schultz v. Indus. Coils, Inc. 373 N.W.2d 74, 75 (Ct. of App. Wis. 1985).
265. Schlossberg & Malerba, supranote 1 at 4.
266. See, e.g., Complaint, Simonetti v. Delta Airlines Inc., No. 1: 05-CV-2321, 2005 WL
2407621 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
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